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With an estimated 115 million children not attending 
primary school in the developing world, increasing 
access to education is critical. Resource constraints limit 
the effectiveness of demand-based subsidies. This paper 
focuses on the importance of a supply-side factor—the 
availability of low-cost teachers—and the resulting ability 
of the market to offer affordable education. The authors 
first show that private schools are three times more likely 
to emerge in villages with government girls’ secondary 
schools (GSS). Identification is obtained by using official 
school construction guidelines as an instrument for 
the presence of GSS. In contrast, there is little or no 
relationship between the presence of a private school and 
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girls’ primary or boys’ primary and secondary government 
schools. In support of a supply-channel, the authors then 
show that, for villages that received a GSS, there are over 
twice as many educated women and that private school 
teachers’ wages are 27 percent lower in these villages. In 
an environment with poor female education and low 
mobility, GSS substantially increase the local supply of 
skilled women lowering wages locally and allowing the 
market to offer affordable education. These findings 
highlight the prominent role of women as teachers in 
facilitating educational access and resonate with similar 
historical evidence from developed economies. The 
students of today are the teachers of tomorrow.Students Today, Teachers Tomorrow? Identifying
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11 Introduction
Despite the powerful global consensus created through the Millennium Development
Goals, over a third of developing countries are ￿o￿-track￿ in achieving universal primary
enrollment by 2015. One explanation for this poor performance is that the demand for
education is ine￿ciently low. This is likely if parents do not fully internalize educational re-
turns for their children.1 In contrast to demand-based explanations, this paper evaluates the
importance of a key supply-side constraint: the availability of a￿ordable teachers. Teacher
shortages can pose severe and persistent constraints. A high ratio of unskilled to skilled
workers in the labor force implies a large skill premium, and thus, a high relative cost of
training the uneducated. When credit markets are imperfect or long-term commitments are
not credible, this high cost of training can lead to poverty traps (Ljungqvist 1993, Banerjee
2004).
The potential pool of teachers is limited in many parts of the developing world. Less than
12 percent of the population in Sub-Saharan Africa complete secondary education, with the
more educated concentrated in urban areas. Educationists increasingly argue that there are
severe teacher ￿shortages,￿ a concern that resonates with the challenges faced in designing
incentives for teachers to move to rural areas and to exert greater e￿ort (UNESCO 2004,
Urquiola and Vegas 2005, Chaudhury et al. 2006). Recent work on the decline in teaching
quality in the United States also highlights the link between the supply of teachers and
female labor force participation (Corcoran et al. 2004, Hoxby and Leigh 2004). Given this
stress on teacher supply in low-income countries, it is therefore surprising that there is little
micro-economic evidence relating a higher supply of potential teachers to better educational
provision.
In this paper, we show that public investments in secondary education facilitate future
1This view has led to prescriptions such as conditional cash transfers whereby parents are incentivized to
send their children to school (Schultz 2004, Filmer and Schady 2006). However, the high marginal cost of
such programs may reduce their appeal: Estimates suggest that the cost per marginal child exceeds $9,000
in Mexico and $400 in Pakistan￿￿gures that are very close to the GDP per capita of these countries (de
Janvry and Sadoulet 2006, Chaudhury and Parjuli 2010).
1educational provision by increasing the local pool of potential teachers and therefore de-
creasing the cost of providing education. In other words, the students of today become the
teachers of tomorrow.
There are two steps to our argument. First, we show that the construction of government
girls’ secondary schools (henceforth GSS) in Pakistan had a large causal impact on the edu-
cation market: Instrumental variable estimates suggest that villages where such schools were
constructed are 27 percentage points, or three times more likely to see private schools emerge
in the following years. The focus on private schools is important since the private sector bet-
ter re￿ects local market conditions and thus aids in the identi￿cation of the teacher supply
channel. 2In the second step, we argue that GSS construction impacts private school location
because it augments local teacher supply in an environment with low female geographical
and occupational mobility.
The causal impact of GSS construction on private school location could also capture
the e￿ect of changes in demand: Educated mothers likely demand greater education for
their children. In support of the ￿women as teachers￿ supply channel, we ￿rst document
that: (a) private provision is a￿ected only by GSS construction (girls’ primary or boys’ pri-
mary/secondary schools have little e￿ect); (b) having a GSS more than doubles the number
of women in the (median) village with secondary or higher education; and (c) the fraction of
secondary educated females in a village has a large impact on private educational provision,
while the fraction of similarly educated men does not. These facts could still be reconciled
with demand-side explanations if the demand for education is primarily driven by mothers
with secondary education (as opposed to mothers with primary education or fathers with
any level of education). A more conclusive test is based on the e￿ect of GSS construction on
private school teachers’ wages: Demand-side explanations suggest that teacher wages should
2The vast majority of private schools operate in a free and relatively unregulated market as for-pro￿t,
co-educational, English-medium schools that o￿er secular education (contrary to popular views, non-pro￿t
and religious schools play a small role in Pakistan, with at most a 3 percent enrollment share, Andrabi et al.
2006) and hire teachers from the local market. This is in contrast to the government sector where teacher
hiring is governed by teachers’ unions, state-wide hiring regulations, and non-transparent processes.
2increase in villages with a GSS; supply-side explanations suggest the opposite. In support
of the latter, we show that private school teachers’ wages are 27 percent lower in villages
with a GSS. With teacher wages accounting for close to 90 percent of the operational costs
of private schools, this o￿ers a substantial cost advantage. Moreover, consistent with the hy-
pothesized mechanism, we ￿nd that this wage drop is higher in villages with more restricted
female labor markets as proxied by village development indicators and sex-ratios.
To address the (potential) non-random placement of GSSs, we use an instrumental vari-
ables approach that exploits o￿cial eligibility guidelines for GSS construction from a Social
Action Program in the 1980s. According to these guidelines, villages with higher popula-
tions were given a preference for GSS construction as long as there were no other GSSs
(in neighboring villages) within a ten-kilometer radius. To operationalize the concept of
neighboring villages in the absence of geo-referenced village locational data, we use the next
highest administrative classi￿cation, the ￿Patwar-Circle￿ (PC), which typically covers four
geographically contiguous villages and a land-area close to the ten-kilometer radius. Captur-
ing the essence of this guideline, our binary instrument is an indicator for ￿local top-rank￿
that takes the value 1 if a village has the largest population among all the (neighboring)
villages in its PC, and 0 otherwise.
Non-linearities and discontinuities in the eligibility rule (two villages with equal popula-
tions may or may not be eligible depending on their population rank within their neighbors)
allow us to simultaneously control for polynomial e￿ects of a village’s own population, which
have arguably independent e￿ects on the educational market. Under the assumption that
private school placement is not determined in the same non-linear and highly discontinuous
fashion as the eligibility rule, the instrumental variables (IV) estimate is consistent.
The primary threat to this IV strategy is that unobservable attributes of villages with
the highest population rank within a PC or the rank itself may be directly correlated with
the existence of a private school. Speci￿cally, estimates would be biased upwards if the gov-
ernment used the same strategy to allocate other public investments that may also directly
3impact the educational market, and/or if the private sector responds to rank conditions
or factors associated with it in a similar fashion. We believe this to be unlikely, since the
historical record shows that PCs are used only as revenue collection units, while political
representation, and with it the delivery of public services, is centered at the Union-Council
level, an alternate and non-overlapping classi￿cation.
Three empirical tests, in the spirit of Altonji et al. (2005), provide further support for the
exclusion restriction. First, village socio-demographic characteristics are uncorrelated with
the eligibility status of the village: Eligible and non-eligible villages do not di￿er along any
observable dimensions other than those (population and area) on which the instrument is
based. Second, the instrument does not predict the construction of any other type of public
school nor any of a range of other public investments. Third, only local population rank
corresponding to the ten-kilometer guideline matters. An analogous but more expanded local
rank measure (top rank at the next higher administrative level which has a radius three times
that of a PC’s) does not predict girls secondary school construction. If entrepreneurs are more
likely to pick locally top-ranked villages, we would expect this result to hold for the slightly
more expanded top-rank measure as well. Furthermore, in a falsi￿cation exercise, we con￿rm
that our instrument has no impact on private school location decisions in administrative units
where there was no GSS construction. Thus, local population rank on its own does not a￿ect
private sector location decisions.
One natural question is whether this increase in the supply of teachers has led to an
increase in educational provision or a sectoral shift from public to private schools. There
are several reasons to think that the growth of private schools has had a positive impact on
educational outcomes, both in terms of enrollment and learning outcomes. In a representative
sample of households in the country (the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey 1998), overall
enrollment is higher for villages with private schools (61 percent versus 46 percent), as is
female enrollment (56 percent versus 35 percent). Moreover, Kim et al. (1999) provide
strong causal evidence that private schools increase enrollment by showing that a randomly
4allocated subsidy for the creation of private schools in rural Pakistan led to increases of 14.6
and 22.1 percentage points in female enrollment for two of three program districts, likely by
increasing school density (in a context where distance has important a￿ects on enrollment).
For the data used in this paper, enrollment rates in villages with private schools are 13
percentage points higher after conditioning on the presence of all types of public schooling,
village population, and wealth, and accounting for all PC-level time-invariant factors. 3
In addition, test scores of children in rural private schools are higher than those of
their government counterparts even after accounting for possible child selection through IV
and dynamic panel data methods. In tests administered to children in Grades 3 and 5,
those in private schools outperformed public school students by 0.83 standard deviations in
English, 0.67 standard deviations in the vernacular (Urdu), and 0.65 standard deviations
in Mathematics (see Andrabi et al. forthcoming, Andrabi et al. 2011). This di￿erence is
further accentuated in cost terms because private schools are cheaper. The unionization and
pay-grade of public teachers implies that the per-child costs of private schools are half those
of public schools, a result consistent with ￿ndings from several countries around the world
(Jimenez et al. 1991, Kim et al. 1999, Orazem 2000, Hoxby and Leigh 2004).
In thinking about the wider applicability of our results, it is worth separating the exis-
tence of supply-side constraints from their empirical identi￿cation. While such constraints
are likely to a￿ect educational provision more widely, there are several reasons why Pak-
istan is particularly well-suited for this empirical exercise. First, it has a large for-pro￿t,
unregulated private sector presence in education, accounting for 35 percent of primary school
enrollment. This allows us to use variation in private sector provision of education as an
indicator of variation in market forces. Second, government schools are segregated by both
gender and level (primary or secondary), and labor markets are occupationally and geo-
graphically restricted for women. The combination of locally segmented markets for women
3While one may be tempted to instrument for private school existence in these regressions using the
population rank instrument used in the paper (and we get even larger results if we do so), we do not believe
the exclusion restriction is defensible in this case, i.e., top-ranked villages are both more likely to get a GSS
and in turn a private school, and both these factors directly lead to increased enrollment.
5with the gender and grade segregation of schools allows us to empirically isolate the impact
of the local (gender and level-speci￿c) supply shock on the private education market.
In environments with geographically integrated labor markets, the e￿ect of an increase
in local supply, while possibly just as important, would be harder to observe in the data
since it would vary only at a higher level of geographical aggregation. Anecdotal evidence
suggests that supply constraints in the form of teacher shortages are equally binding in Latin
America or Sub-Saharan Africa. However, it may be harder to empirically demonstrate the
e￿ect of increasing local supply on the educational market if there are high migration rates.
Our results suggest that assuring a supply of teachers in rural areas of low-income coun-
tries is indeed a ￿rst-order problem that educational systems have to tackle. As in the
United States (Rivkin et al. 2005), a consistent ￿nding from observational and experimen-
tal studies in low-income countries is that augmenting teacher resources leads to better
outcomes, whether through reducing class-sizes (Case and Deaton 1999, Urquiola 2006), re-
ducing teacher absenteeism (Du￿o et al. 2009), or providing additional teachers for poorly
performing students (Banerjee et al. 2007). A natural question is whether ￿nding these
teachers in the ￿rst place is going to be a problem. The only randomized intervention (to
our knowledge) that tried to increase the supply of schools through the private educational
market failed precisely because teachers could not be found (Alderman et al. 2003).
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows: Section 2 is a brief guide to the
institutional context and data. Section 3 presents the empirical methodology, and Section 4
the results. Section 5 concludes.
2 Institutional Background and Data
2.1 The Context
Pakistan, as in other South Asian and African countries, has experienced an explosion
in the share of the private sector in education, both in terms of schooling availability and
6the enrollment share. The past two decades have seen more than a ten-fold increase in the
number of private primary schools (3,800 in 1983 to 47,000 by 2005), and currently, over
a third of primary-level enrollment is in the private sector, with the fastest growth coming
from rural areas (Andrabi et al. 2008). 4 While this private school growth is impressive, it
has generated more cross-sectional than time-series variation with growth mostly bunched
in the 1990s. Hence, our paper exploits the cross-sectional variation in private school lo-
cation to identify constraints to education provision. One of the key observations for the
purposes of this paper is that since these private schools represent for-pro￿t enterprises op-
erating in a largely unrestricted market (there are no public subsidies and little regulation),
their locational decisions are informative with respect to supply and demand factors in the
educational market rather than public priorities or ideology (which may in￿uence the loca-
tion of public, NGO, or religious schools). Central to this argument is the importance of
women (as teachers) in the provision of private education coupled with the limited availabil-
ity of secondary-educated women in a restricted geographical labor market and the resulting
impact on skilled female wages.
Key to understanding the private sector is its a￿ordability and size. Andrabi et al. (2008)
show that the median annual fee in a Pakistani rural private school in 2000 was Rs. 600,
so that a month’s fee was somewhat less than the daily wage rate of an unskilled worker. 5
The data show that there are few ￿xed costs in running a private school in Pakistan (private
schools are often setup initially in the teacher/owner’s house) with teachers’ wages forming
the bulk (90 percent) of the overall operational costs with typical schools utilizing four
teachers and enrolling around 100 children. Moreover, most teachers in private schools are
locally-resident females with (at least) a secondary education.
4 Contrary to popular belief and media reporting, these changes have little to do with religious education.
Andrabi et al. (2006) show that enrollment in religious schools, or madrassas is low (roughly 1 percent) and
has remained constant since the mid-80s.
5In contrast, private schools (elementary and secondary) in the United States charged $3,524 in 1991. At
14 percent of GDP per capita, the relative cost of private schooling is 3.5 times higher in the US.
7It is this reliance on female teachers that enables the private sector to o￿er a￿ordable edu-
cation.6 In the context of a highly patriarchal society, limited geographical and occupational
mobility for women implies that locally resident women o￿er a cheaper (￿captured￿) supply
of teachers. Female wages are indeed 30 percent lower than male wages after controlling for
educational quali￿cations and experience (World Bank 2005). More than 70 percent of all
women live in the village where they were born; less than 3 percent are engaged in o￿-farm
work; and among those with secondary education and a wage-earning job, 87 percent are
teachers or health workers. Safety concerns and a patriarchal society restrict the ability of
women to ￿nd wage work outside the village where they live or in occupations other than
teaching and publicly provided health care (World Bank 2005).
The presence of locally resident women can thus reduce the overall cost of wages for
schools, but an assured supply in the local vicinity is critical. However, the supply of potential
female teachers is low and varies across villages based on the availability of nearby schooling
options. In 1981, there were four literate (adult) women (out of 242) in the median village in
Punjab, the largest and most dynamic province in the country. Over 60 percent of villages in
the province had three or less secondary-school educated women, and 41 percent had none.
This was driven in part by a shortage of local secondary schooling options for rural women.
A simple correlation in our regression sample between the availability of GSS and secondary
educated women (in 1998) suggests that the presence of a GSS is associated with an increase
of over 50 percent (compared to the median village without a GSS) in the (1998) percentage
of women with a secondary education (from 3 to 4.6 percent).
These two features of the market for female skilled labor￿low wages and limited supply￿
combined with the unrestricted and unsubsidized market for private schooling inform our
empirical strategy. The presence of a GSS should generate cross-sectional variation in the
availability of locally resident women with secondary education. If teacher supply constrains
6In comparison, wages for public sector teachers are ￿ve times higher for both men and women. As a
result, per-child spending in rural private schools (Rs. 1012 annually) is half of that in rural public schools
(Rs. 2039 annually), although available facilities are comparable across the two.
8education provision (and there is limited mobility) this in turn should a￿ect the likelihood
of a private school existing in a village.
2.2 Data
We employ three data sources: (a) a complete census of private schools carried out by
the Federal Bureau of Statistics in 2000; (b) administrative data on the location and date
of construction of public schools in the Punjab province available from the province’s Edu-
cational Management and Information Systems (EMIS 2001) augmented with the National
Educational Census (NEC 2005); and (c) data on village-level demographics and educa-
tional pro￿les from the 1998 and the 1981 population censuses of Punjab, which provide
both baseline and contemporaneous information on village-level characteristics.
We restrict our analysis to rural areas in the province of Punjab, the largest province
in the country which hosts 60 percent of the population, two-thirds of whom live in rural
areas.7 Since the EMIS and the other datasets do not employ a common village coding
scheme, we had to match villages in the di￿erent databases on the basis of their names.
Using a combination of a phonetic algorithm and manual post-match, we were able to match
over 90 percent of the villages across databases (23,064 of the 25,266 unique Punjabi villages
in the 1981 census).8
In our ￿nal estimation sample, we restrict attention to villages that did not receive
a girls’ or boys’ secondary school prior to 1981 and did not have such secondary schools
in their neighboring villages. This reduces our sample to 9,333 villages, but a￿ords two
7Not all data sets (e.g., EMIS, 1981 Census) were readily accessible for other provinces, and urban areas
could not be matched at the granular level necessary to exploit the cross-sectional variation in private school
location and GSS presence that we utilize in the paper.
8We also augment the public schooling data from the EMIS with more recent data from the 2005 National
Educational Census. We are able to match some more villages using the NEC, but cannot use this as the
primary data source because of insu￿cient information on the upgradation of schools from primary to
secondary. Speci￿cally, there is a chance in the NEC data that we incorrectly assign a village to have
received a GSS by 2000 when it only had a primary school that was upgraded to a secondary school after
2000. Since our empirical strategy examines the relationship between pre-existing girls secondary schools
and private schools (as of 2000, the date of the private school census), the correct thing would be to classify
such a village as not having a GSS.
9advantages. First, it allows for cleaner econometric identi￿cation and interpretation of the
results as our instrument utilizes public school construction guidelines that were applied
for GSSs constructed after the 1980s.9 This also alleviates exclusion restriction concerns
that arise if our instrument were to predict other public goods. Second, focusing on the
shorter exposure (to GSS) periods is likely to better isolate supply-side e￿ects since GSS
construction probably impacts a range of demand factors over a longer time span. It is
nevertheless reassuring to note that all of our main results hold in the full sample of villages,
both in terms of statistical and economic signi￿cance, and several of these results are in fact
stronger (Appendix Table II).10
Table I presents summary statistics for the ￿nal sample. Two and a half percent, or 232
villages, in this sample received a GSS between 1981 and 2001. 11 Conditional on existence,
9We are not aware of similar guidelines used in previous years. To the extent they were, we are reluctant
to use the 1981 population (the earliest available census data at the village-level) to construct population
rank for earlier years. Focusing on villages which did not receive secondary schools prior to 1981 also allows
us to better control for village-level baseline data prior to the construction of a public school. For villages
with pre-existing secondary schools, it is harder to discern whether di￿erences in the baseline data arise
from selection into villages or the exposure to the secondary school. While we could have also excluded
villages which received girls’/boys’ primary schools prior to the 1980s, this is too severe a restriction and
would eliminate most of our sample. Finally, we are also concerned with pre-existing secondary schools
since we believe they are more likely to re￿ect village wealth, size, or in￿uence. We therefore also exclude
villages whose neighbours’ have pre-existing secondary schools, since that could have spillover e￿ects through
inter-village marriages and may mask supply-side channels. We are less worried about primary schools in
neighboring villages a￿ecting village demand, since there is considerable evidence that younger children do
not travel outside their village to go to school (Alderman 1995, Andrabi et al. 2009).
10A couple of di￿erences in the full sample results are worth noting and provide further support for our
data restriction. Column (2) of Appendix Table II shows if we use the full sample, the instrument predicts
boys’ secondary school construction. This is not the case in the restricted sample (Column (5), Table II). The
full sample association is not surprising because local rank criteria may have been used for BSS allocation
in the past and/or the 1981 population may be an outcome of secondary school construction (since it is
no longer a baseline variable as the full sample includes schools constructed before 1981). In addition, the
impact of GSS on teacher wages in the village is noteworthy. While our restricted sample result shows
that GSS presence leads to a lower wage (Table V), in the full sample we ￿nd that exposure to GSS has
a non-linear e￿ect on teacher wages. Initial exposure to GSS is indeed associated with lower wages, but
prolonged exposure (more than 26 years) is associated with higher wages (the linear term on years exposure
is negative while the quadratic terms is positive and of smaller magnitude). This is indeed consistent with
our net supply impact interpretation of a GSS within the time-frame we are in (20 years) but suggests that,
in the longer term, the demand e￿ect may dominate: As more and more educated girls become mothers
and grand-mothers, they impact educational demand. It therefore o￿ers another important consideration
for why restricting our analysis to the reduced sample is appropriate in identifying the (initially dominant)
supply channel.
11This number is quite low relative to what the school construction guidelines would have suggested. While
this is not surprising given that these guidelines were constrained by budgetary limitations, it may lead to
concerns about the power of the instrument and the external validity of our results. We therefore address
10the median age of a GSS is 14 years, therefore most were constructed early on in the 20-year
period. There is a private school in one out of every eight villages, and the majority of these
villages already had or received a primary public school. Finally, the number of women
reporting secondary or higher education (eight or more years of schooling) increased from
one in the median village in 1981 to nine by 1998.
3 Methodology and Empirical Framework
There are two broad empirical challenges that we seek to address in this paper. The ￿rst
is to identify the causal impact of GSSs on subsequent private school existence. The second
is to argue that this works, in part, through a teacher supply channel rather than an increase
in the demand for education from secondary-educated women.
A simple framework outlines the private entrepreneur’s problem, focusing on the role of
the public sector and the econometric and interpretational issues in identifying the impact
of a GSS on the educational market. An entrepreneur opens a school in village i if the net
return, de￿ned as the di￿erence between total revenues and total costs, is positive. 12 For
private schools in Pakistan, school fees and teachers’ salaries account for 98.4 percent and
89 percent of total revenues and costs, respectively (Andrabi et al. 2008). We therefore
approximate the net return for a school in village i as:
NetReturni = Feei ￿ Ni ￿ Wagei ￿ Ti (1)
where Feei is the average private school fee for a single student, Wagei is the average private
school teacher’s salary, and Ni and Ti are the number of students enrolled and teachers
employed. Since the schooling market may be geographically segregated, we allow wages
and fees to di￿er across villages.
these in detail later in the paper.
12This assumes that there is no shortage of entrepreneurs (otherwise, not every positive NPV project will
be undertaken). Incorporating such shortages does not change the qualitative results. The qualitative results
also extend to a dynamic framework provided that the ￿xed costs of setting up schools is small.
11The construction of a GSS increases the supply of teachers in the village, thus a￿ecting
Wagei. However, it may also increase the potential demand for schooling, re￿ected in Feei.
A reduced form expression for net return can then be written as:









i are village demographics and characteristics that respectively a￿ect the
demand for private schooling and the costs of running such schools. Variables in XD
i and
Xs
i include village population, measures of village wealth, adult literacy, and alternative
schooling options. GSS construction has two e￿ects in Equation (2): It alters the demand
for private education by creating a more educated populace through ￿1, and it a￿ects the
cost of setting up private schools by shifting the local supply of potential teachers through
￿1. We are interested both in the joint estimation of (￿1 +￿1) and in arguing that the there
is a supply channel (i.e., ￿1 is positive and signi￿cant).
Since the net return a private school earns is not observed, we treat net return in Equation
(2) as a latent variable in a probability model such that Prob(PrivateSchoolExists) =
Prob(NetReturni > 0), and estimate a version of Equation (2):






rSirt + (vi + "it) (3)
where Privateit is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if a private school exists in village
i in time t and GSSit is a binary variable that takes the value 1 if a GSS exists in village
i at time t. XD
it observed characteristics village characteristics at time t. Sirt are other
government schooling options (primary boys/girls schools and boys secondary school) at
time t, where each option is indexed by r. The error term, (vi + "it), consists of a time-
invariant unobserved component, vi, and a random component, "it. The main identi￿cation
challenge is that the presence of a GSS in village i in time period t is likely a function of the
12latent unobserved components of the village/region:
GSSit = ￿
0 + ’Xit + (￿i + ￿it): (4)
Thus, the OLS estimate of (￿1+￿1) in Equation (3) is biased and inconsistent if cov(￿i;￿i) 6=
0. While ￿rst di￿erencing Equation (3) helps, the estimated (￿1 +￿1) in such a speci￿cation
would still be biased if cov("it;￿it) 6= 0 (i.e., there are time-varying covariates that deter-
mine receiving a GSS and a￿ect private school presence). Therefore, we instrument for GSS
construction using program guidelines for a school expansion program undertaken in the
1980s.
3.1 Identi￿cation Strategy
Our instrumental variables strategy exploits the fact that the regressor of interest, the
construction of a GSS, is partly based on a deterministic function of a known covariate,
village population. If this deterministic function is non-linear and non-monotonic, it can be
used as an instrument while directly controlling for linear and polynomial functions of the
underlying covariate itself (see Campbell [1969], and Angrist and Lavy [1999]).
GSS construction after 1981 was a consequence of the 1980 Pakistan Social Action Pro-
gram (SAP). Speci￿c guidelines a￿ected where these schools could be built. In particular,
the recommended guidelines for opening a new GSS speci￿ed a preference for higher village
populations and stipulated that there be no other GSS within a ten-kilometer radius.
In order to capture this guideline, we construct a binary assignment rule, Rulei, that
takes the value 1 if the village is the largest village (in terms of population) amongst nearby
villages and 0 otherwise. This captures the radius criteria. If a village is not the largest village
amongst its neighbors, the neighbor would receive a GSS ￿rst given the stated preference
for population. Provided this school is near enough, the village will be less likely to receive
its own public school.13 In the absence of precise village location data, we use the next
13Another alternative is to use the radius-rule directly and assign Rulei = 0 if there is a village in the
13highest administrative classi￿cation, the ￿Patwar-Circle￿ (PC), which typically covers four
villages, to approximate the radius rule. In terms of actual land area, this is a reasonable
approximation; dividing the size of the province by the number of PCs shows that one school





1 if Populationi = max
j2PCi
(Populationj)
0 if Populationi < max
j2PCi
(Populationj)
Since GSSs could have been built in any year between 1981 and 1998, we assign a value of
one to Rulei if it was the largest village in its PC based either on its 1981 or 1998 population.
In addition, for the 4.5 percent of villages in our sample that are alone in their PC, we assign
a value of 0 to the instrument. Our results are robust to the using either 1981 or 1998
population exclusively or assigning the value 1 to Rulei for single-village PCs.
The eligibility rule is non-linear and non-monotonic in population. It drops to 0 for
larger villages when there is an even larger neighboring village within the PC. In using this
rule as an instrument, we are thus able to explicitly control for continuous functions of
village population (these covariates have a large direct impact on the existence of a private
school). We also include a full set of PC ￿xed e￿ects in our speci￿cation, thus exploiting
rank variation only within a small set of proximate villages. Our ￿nal speci￿cation is of the
form:


















rSirt + (vi + "it) (5)
where the Xit controls also include indicators of village wealth and area. We estimate
Equation (5) using Rulei as an instrument for GSSit.
patwar-circle that has a GSS. This is problematic since we are worried about the endogenous placement of
GSS in the ￿rst place.
14With PC ￿xed e￿ects and population controls, the remaining variation that the rule
exploits is likely uncorrelated with the demand for private schooling. Nevertheless, there
may still be concerns that the same local rank criteria is relevant for the provision of other
public goods. In Section 4, we present several robustness tests to check for the validity of
the exclusion restriction. Speci￿cally, we show (a) that our instrument does not predict the
construction of other public goods and (b) that it is the local (within-PC) population rank
that matters rather than a village’s population rank in the next larger administrative unit
above a PC, where the radius rule would less likely apply.
3.2 Isolating the Supply-Side
To separate supply from demand-side channels, we propose two strategies based on the
relative e￿ect of educated women versus educated men in the location decisions of private
schools (the quantity margin) and the costs of operating private schools in villages with and
without a GSS (the price margin).
On the quantity margin, a supply-side channel suggests several patterns. In particular, we
expect that: (a) since most teachers in private schools report at least a secondary education
(98 percent), secondary schools should have a larger impact on private school existence than
primary schools; (b) the e￿ect of GSS should be larger than that of boys’ secondary schools;
(c) villages with a GSS should report a larger stock of educated women; 14 and (d) private
school existence should respond more to women with higher education than men with higher
education. While results in the expected direction lend support to the supply-side channel ,
explanations based on the relative importance of women versus men or secondary versus
primary education in fostering the demand for education cannot be ruled out.
More conclusive evidence for the presence of the supply-side channel comes from the
price margin. If private schools locate in villages with a GSS due to increases in demand,
14This test is relies on there being limited migration. To the extent that educated women migrate out
(in), the estimates could be attenuated (overestimated). With female migration rates around 15% (Hamid
2010) we don’t perceive this as a substantial concern.
15we should see higher teachers’ wages in such villages. Conversely, if the GSS e￿ect works
through the supply channel, we should observe lower wages. Therefore, one should test for
di￿erences in skilled women’s wages in villages with and without a GSS. 15
However, the challenge in doing so is a data issue: The only available village-level data
that captures skilled women’s wages is the private school census, which records average
teacher wages in all private schools. 16 Since we do not observe wages in villages without
private schools, a simple correlation of wages and GSS may be biased, with the bias depending
both on how GSS were placed and on the truncation of the wage distribution due to missing
wages in villages without private schools. We follow two approaches to address the selection
problem. We use a Heckman selection model, where the selection stage is the probability
of observing a positive wage, which corresponds to having a private school in the village.
Another alternative is to use the ￿control-function￿ approach, where we condition on the
predicted probability of observing a non-missing value of the wage-bill in the wage equation
(Angrist 1995). Details of both approaches are in Appendix I.
We should caution that we cannot structurally estimate the size of the supply-side e￿ects.
For instance, simultaneous changes in the demand for schooling due to GSS construction im-
ply that the supply-side impact of GSS construction on (decreasing) the wage-bill represents
a lower bound. Therefore, our strategy indicates the presence of a supply-side impact but
has less to say about its size.
15If there is a preference to teach in private schools, increased demand could drop wages as teachers may
be willing to accept lower wages in new private schools. However, instead there is a strong preference for
public schools (better pay and easier job). In addition, the labor market for public and private schools is
quite di￿erent, with the former being non-local and the latter local. Moreover, within private schools, the
market is not strati￿ed so it is unlikely that there would be systematic compensating di￿erentials across
di￿erent private schools. One may also be concerned about whether private school wages are meaningful if
the owners also teach (wages may be confounded with pro￿ts). We do not think this is a substantive issue.
A detailed examination of pro￿ts using the smaller sample in the LEAPS database, suggests that median
pro￿ts are quite comparable to a teacher’s wage. Moreover, most of these schools do employ non-family/paid
labor and therefore reported wages indeed re￿ect the opportunity cost of hiring (local) skilled women,
16An alternate data source is the Pakistan Integrated Household Survey (PIHS). Unfortunately, given the
small number of villages that received a GSS, the available sample sizes are too small in the PIHS. With the
sample restrictions in our paper, we ￿nd only three villages in the treatment and thirty-one villages in the
control set for these data. Moreover, since the majority of (the few) women who work in non-farm activities
are teachers, and the vast majority of private school teachers are women, the private school wage bill is likely
to re￿ect the wages of skilled women.
164 Results
4.1 Instrumental Variable Strategy: First Stage and Speci￿cation
Checks
To clarify the identifying assumptions needed for our IV strategy, Figure I illustrates
how the existence of private schools and the binary instrument covary with the 1981 village
population (the relationship with 1998 population is similar). Here, we plot Rulei for all
villages in our sample and the non-parametric relationship between private school location
and village population. There are both ￿eligible￿ (Rulei = 1) and ￿ineligible￿ (Rulei = 0)
villages at all population levels. We can thus compare two villages with the same population,
one of which was eligible to receive the GSS and another that was not, allowing us to exclude
the direct e￿ect of population on private school existence. Further, the non-parametric
relationship between private school existence and village population is approximately linear;
it is therefore likely that linear and quadratic population terms in the regression speci￿cation
su￿ciently control for the underlying relationship between village population and private
school existence.
Table II, Columns (1) and (2) present regression estimates using the eligibility rule as
a predictor for the location of GSS. Column (1) runs a probit speci￿cation with linear and
quadratic controls for population, and shows that an eligible village was 1.24 percentage
points more likely to receive a GSS. Column (2) augments the ￿rst stage with other village-
level public goods and PC ￿xed e￿ects, resulting in similar point estimates that are signi￿cant
at the 1 percent level of con￿dence: Villages with Rulei = 1 were 1.6 percentage points more
likely to receive a GSS. Although the point estimate seems small, this is because few girls’
secondary schools were constructed. In fact, this estimate represents an almost 100 percent
increase over the fraction of ineligible (instrument = 0) villages that had received a GSS by
2001. In addition, both the basic and the more demanding ￿rst stage are at or above the
17proposed critical thresholds for detecting weak instruments (Stock et al. 2002).
Instrument Variables Strategy: Exclusion Restriction
To assess the validity of the exclusion restriction, we ￿rst con￿rm that there are no sta-
tistically signi￿cant baseline di￿erences in educational levels for women or men nor in their
age distribution between eligible (instrument = 1) and ineligible (instrument = 0) villages
(Appendix Table I). The only di￿erences are in the initial population and area, which arise
directly from the construction of the instrument and are controlled for in the IV speci￿ca-
tions. Moreover, there are no di￿erences in 1998 in other village socio-economic attributes
such as the extent of permanent housing, media access (TV and radio), men/women with na-
tional identi￿cation cards, or sex-ratios. This is reassuring since it is consistent with random
assignment of the eligibility rule across villages.
The exclusion restriction could also fail if the government used the same village population-
rank criteria for allocating other investments. Of note is that PC is a historical land revenue
recording unit and has never been used as a jurisdiction for policy making purposes such
as the delivery of public services or political representation. The smallest administrative
political unit has always been the somewhat larger Union Council (UC), with little overlap
between the two. Columns (3) through (8) in Table II directly assess this by demonstrating
that our instrument, local rank in a PC, does not predict any other government investments
apart from GSS. Columns (3) to (5) respectively show that local rank does not predict girls
primary or boys primary/secondary school’s placement. While the point estimates for pri-
mary schools appear similar to that of the GSS, they represent less than a 2 percent increase
relative to the comparison group (i.e. over 50% of ineligible villages also had a primary school
by 2001) as compared to the 100 percent increase for GSSs between eligible and ineligible
villages. Columns (6) through (8) consider other public goods, such as access to potable
water, electri￿cation, and permanent housing structures, and again ￿nd no evidence that
publicly provided goods are higher in eligible villages.
A third possible concern is that being a top-ranked village in a region is important in
18itself and that our instrument does not re￿ect the ten-kilometer-radius rule but a more
general rank e￿ect. For example, one may posit that private entrepreneurs also choose the
largest village within a PC. While we believe such a concern is less plausible (private school
entrepreneurs are almost always local to the village, with schools typically setup in the
entrepreneur’s house), one can test the (independent) importance of local rank by checking
if the local rank within the next largest administrative unit after the PC, a Qannongoh
Halqa (QH), predicts GSS placement. There are roughly ten PCs in a QH, and hence, the
radius rule is unlikely to apply within a QH (villages are a lot further than ten kilometers
apart in a QH). However, if local rank is important in general, one would still expect that
being the top-ranked village in a QH would predict having a GSS. Column (9) shows that
being the top-ranked village in the QH does not predict GSS placement. Column (10) adds
our instrument, local rank in the PC, and shows that our instrument still predicts GSS
placement while the analogous local rank measure at a larger geographical level (the QH)
does not. This lends further support that our instrument predicts GSS placement because
of the ten-kilometer-radius rule rather than some inherent characteristic about top-ranked
villages within administrative units. Moreover, as we detail in the next section, PC-rank
only matters in regions where we would expect it to (i.e., where a GSS was provided). 17
4.2 GSS Impact on Private Schools
Table III ￿rst presents OLS results based on Equation(5). 18 The construction of a GSS
17In addition to these checks, we also conducted a placebo experiment. Starting from the full sample, we
randomly grouped villages into ￿fake￿ PCs with four villages in each PC and classi￿ed villages as eligible
using the new PC classi￿cations and their actual 1981/1998 populations. We then estimated the reduced
form relationship, cov(Privateit;GSSitjPop). These steps were repeated ￿ve thousand times to generate a
distribution of estimated coe￿cients under random assignment of villages to PCs. Our actual reduced form
coe￿cient lies within the top 1 percentile of the distribution of reduced form coe￿cients generated by the
fake PC simulations (the mean and median for the fake distribution are essentially zero). In other words, it
is extremely unlikely that the coe￿cient we obtain is an artifact of a village being large; what matters is the
speci￿c assignment of villages to PCs.
18We focus on the existence of private schools rather than their enrollment share. Most variations in
the number of children enrolled in private schools is driven by the extensive (whether or not there is a
private school in the village) rather than the intensive (variation in private school enrollment conditional on
existence) margin. Our results are similar if we look at private school enrollment. We prefer the extensive
margin since the data on enrollment is noisier.
19increases the probability of a private school in the village by 9.5 percentage points [Column
(1)]. An equally signi￿cant determinant of private school existence is village population;
the GSS e￿ect is similar in magnitude to increasing (1998) village population by around
1500 individuals (slightly below a standard-deviation increase). Note that the speci￿cation
includes a full set of village-level controls, including exposure to other types of public schools
and PC ￿xed e￿ects. Column (2) addresses any selection concerns arising from time-invariant
village e￿ects by ￿rst-di￿erencing (1998 less 1981 values) the data at the village level. The
e￿ect of receiving a GSS on change in private school existence increases slightly to 9.7
percentage points. Propensity score estimates also yield similar results: A GSS increases
private school existence probabilities by around 10 percentage points, depending on whether
we use local linear regression or kernel matching (results available with authors). For the
sake of comparability we use the same baseline year to di￿erence the dependent variable
(i.e. it takes the value one if the private school was created after 1981). There is a concern
that this may be too soon and private schools made before 1984 should be excluded (giving
at least three years past primary for the GSS to produce potential teachers). However,
since most (99%) private schools were created after 1984 in our sample, doing so does not
qualitatively a￿ect our results and so we stick to 1981 as the baseline year for all variables
in the ￿rst-di￿erenced speci￿cation.
Figure II provides a simple illustration of our instrumental variable estimates by dividing
villages into four population quartiles, averaged over 1981 and 1998 populations. The top
panel compares the percentage of villages with a GSS in the ￿eligible￿ ( Rulei = 1) group
compared to ￿ineligible￿ (Rulei = 0) group. Over the entire sample, this di￿erence represents
the ￿rst-stage of the instrumental variables (IV) estimate, cov(GSSit;Rulei): The bottom
panel then compares, over the same population quartiles, the percentage of villages with
a private school in the ￿eligible￿ and ￿ineligible￿ groups; this is the reduced form for the
IV estimate. The ￿gure shows that the instrument varies in every population quartile so
that our results are not driven by variation in a single population group. For all population
20quartiles, the ￿rst-stage indicates that eligible villages were more likely to receive a GSS.
In addition, the reduced form suggests that, controlling for population, villages that were
eligible to receive a GSS were also more likely to see private schools arise at a later date.
Columns (3) to (5) of Table III present the corresponding IV regression coe￿cients.
In Column (3), we present estimates using a linear IV speci￿cation. Given that both the
existence of a GSS and the presence of a private school are binary variables, Columns (4)
and (5) present estimates of the Average Treatment E￿ect (ATE) and Treatment on Treated
(ATT) using a bivariate probit speci￿cation.
Column (3) shows that the estimated coe￿cient of GSS on private school existence in-
creases from the OLS and ￿rst di￿erence speci￿cations to 1.50 in the linear IV speci￿cation,
and the signi￿cance drops to the 10 percent level. Columns (4) and (5) implement the bi-
variate probit speci￿cation and report analytical standard-errors computed using the delta
method. The point-estimate from the bivariate probit is still large but less than a ￿fth that
of the linear IV and signi￿cant at the 10 percent level of con￿dence for the ATE and the
1 percent level for the ATT. The biprobit estimates suggest that private schools are 25 to
27 percentage points more likely to locate in villages with a GSS￿a more than 200 percent
increase over the comparison group (villages without a GSS) probability of 12.3 percent.
The linear IV estimates are larger, and it is likely that the structure of the data accounts
for this di￿erence. As shown in Chiburish et al. (2010), the con￿dence intervals obtained
from linear IV estimates are particularly large when treatment probabilities are low and
the model includes additional covariates. Both of these problems are salient in our context:
Given budget constraints under SAP, only 2.5 percent of the sample actually received the
treatment, and for the exclusion restriction to hold, linear and quadratic population terms
must be included in the speci￿cation (see Chiburish et al. [2010] and Appendix II). As such,
our preferred estimates are from the bivariate probit speci￿cation.
The larger IV estimates suggest that time-varying omitted variables that increase the
likelihood of private schools are in fact negatively correlated with GSS construction. There
21are several reasons why one may plausibly expect this. One interpretation made by Pitt et
al. (1995) in the case of Indonesia is that governments act altruistically, trying to equalize
di￿erences between villages. Villages with lower responsiveness of demand to school con-
struction received GSSs, and these were also the villages where private schools were less
likely to locate. However, the Pakistani context suggests additional explanations, as well.
Schools are often also targeted to villages with powerful/feudal local landlords and o￿cials.
These are precisely the villages where the demand for education is likely lower and less likely
to increase over time. Moreover, given the requirement to give land for free for school con-
struction, these schools were constructed in areas where land prices were also low. To the
extent that low land prices are associated with poor educational returns, we would expect
similar results to those documented here.
A Further Check of the Exclusion Restriction
Columns (6) and (7) present an additional check for our instrument by showing that the
reduced form only holds where one would expect (i.e., regions where at least a GSS was
provided). Here, we divide villages into two sub-groups, ￿program regions,￿ where at least
one village in a broadly de￿ned area (we use QH, the unit larger than a PC) received a GSS
and ￿non-program regions,￿ where no village in the QH received a GSS. Note, in particular,
that even if we do not know how regions were selected, comparisons across program and
non-program areas are instructive. In particular, if population rank within the PC has no
independent e￿ect on the probability of setting up a private school, we should ￿nd a strong
relationship between private school existence and eligibility for villages in program regions
but not in non-program regions. A contrary result in non-program areas would suggest a
violation of the exclusion restriction in our IV strategy. Our results con￿rm that population
rank with the PC has an e￿ect on private school location only in program areas, providing
further support for the instrument. Column (6) shows that for program regions, eligibility
increases the probability of a private school by 3.8 percentage points; conversely, in non-
22program regions, eligibility has no impact on private school existence [Column (7)]. 19
4.3 Potential Channels: Evidence for Supply-Side E￿ects
We now consider whether the causal impact of GSS on the educational market works
through a supply-side channel. As described in Section 3, we do so by examining the impact
of GSS on both the quantity and price margins.
Quantity Margin
If private schools arise because of the availability of ￿women as teachers,￿ we expect
a GSS to have a larger impact relative to other types of public schooling. Columns (1)
and (2) in Table IV present estimates from a linear probability model and a ￿rst di￿erence
speci￿cation, both of which include PC-level location dummies. Both speci￿cations con￿rm
the importance of GSS relative to other types of public schooling. Column (1) shows that
the coe￿cient for years of exposure to a GSS is almost four times as large as that of the
next most important public school type. The ￿rst-di￿erence speci￿cation shows that by
better addressing time-invariant village selection factors the importance of GSS is further
magni￿ed: The change (from 1981 to 1998) in whether a village has a GSS or not is the
only schooling variable that matters, and the magnitude of the e￿ect is large. In contrast,
whether a village received a boys’ primary/secondary or girls’ primary school between 1981
and 1998 has no a￿ect on the likelihood of a private school setting up in the village (in fact,
there is a negative association for boys’ primary schools).
Columns (3) to (6) present the next logical step. We assess the correlation between
educated women and the presence of a GSS for a variety of speci￿cations. In both the OLS
and ￿rst-di￿erence speci￿cations, a GSS increases the number of adult women with higher
19We also estimated a single pooled speci￿cation that controls for potential di￿erences between program
and non-program regions by including the predicted propensity (and its quadratic) of being a program region.
Results (not shown) were very similar; the coe￿cient of the interaction between GSS and a program region
is large and highly signi￿cant. In contrast, the eligibility rule in non-program regions has no e￿ect on private
school placement. Replicating the ￿rst-stage, linear IV, and biprobit estimates for program regions also
produces similar results and with more statistical signi￿cance given a stronger ￿rst-stage (not surprising,
since identi￿cation is achieved only o￿ the variation in program regions).
23levels of education (equal to eight or more years of schooling) by 9.5 to 10.8 more women,
and the estimated increases are signi￿cant at the 1 percent level of con￿dence. Although
this appears to be a small e￿ect, it represents a substantial change in the stock of educated
women. With eight women in the median village (without a GSS) in 1998 reporting higher
levels of education, a GSS more than doubles this number. Column (5) utilizes a similar IV
strategy and, as before, shows that while the IV estimate is signi￿cant, it is substantially
larger than the OLS estimate. This is due to the relatively small ￿rst stage coe￿cient (see
Table II). Column (6) makes this clear by presenting the reduced form estimate. While the
large magnitude of the IV estimate is di￿cult to take literally and we believe the OLS/￿rst
di￿erence estimates are more realistic, the point is that GSS existence substantially increases
the number of educated women in the village even when potential selection concerns are taken
into account.20
Columns (7) and (8) then examine the importance of secondary school educated women
for the existence of a private school. In both the OLS and ￿rst-di￿erence speci￿cations, the
impact of women with eight or more years of schooling is large and very signi￿cant, while the
percentage of similarly educated males has no impact on the existence of a private school.
In fact, the point estimate is one-tenth that of the female e￿ect (and of the wrong sign in
the ￿rst-di￿erence speci￿cation).
Another potential approach to isolating the supply-side is to use variation in the timing
of the public school construction since supply-side channels suggest that private schools will
emerge ￿ve to eight years after the construction of a GSS (or three years if there was a
preexisting primary school). Unfortunately, the data are too limited to exploit this variation
but there is suggestive evidence that this is indeed the case. 21
20We should note that the OLS/￿rst-di￿erence are large enough to generate (the few) teachers one would
need for the supply channel, but not enough to produce su￿cient educated mothers that one would expect if
the demand channel were the primary driver. While the IV estimates could generate such a demand channel,
they are implausibly large: The median village in our sample has only 9 women with higher education in
1998, with a mean of 26 and, with a typical GSS only graduating around 5 or so girls per year. Even by
2005, an increase of 220 women is therefore quite implausible.
21We require villages with both private schools and a GSS. Since only 232 villages received a GSS, and of
these, 26 percent had a private school, we are unable to identify any discontinuities using the 60 or so villages
24While these results by themselves may not rule out a demand-side channel, they do
substantially constrain the routes through which it can work. Fathers’ education could
not stimulate demand for children’s education (since boys’ schools have no e￿ect); primary
schooling for mothers could not be enough to stimulate demand; mothers’ schooling must
therefore have a non-linear e￿ect on the demand for children’s education.
Price Margin
Table V provides further evidence for a supply channel by examining the price margin.
Recall, in sharp contrast to a demand-channel, a supply channel would suggest that GSS
construction would lead to a fall in private school teacher (i.e. skilled women) wages. We
compare the average (log) teacher salary in private schools in villages with and without a
GSS using data from the private school census. Column (1) presents the OLS results in
the sample of villages for which we have teacher wage data. We include PC FEs in all
speci￿cations. The results are large and signi￿cant: Private schools in villages with a GSS
report a 27 percent lower average (teaching) wage.
Columns (2) through (5) correct for selection into the wage sample. Columns (2) and (3)
present results using Heckman’s selection model, and Columns (4) and (5) use the ￿control
function￿ approach (see Appendix I). In both approaches, identi￿cation is based on the
non-linearity of the selection equation (see Du￿o [2001] as an example). Augmenting the
instrument set with potential candidates that are correlated to the probability of having
a private school but uncorrelated to the wage-bill can help with the identi￿cation and the
e￿ciency of the estimator. Following Downes and Greenstein (1996), we propose using the
that have both. An alternate strategy is to check whether there is a di￿erence in the existence of a private
school based on years of exposure to a GSS. Here, we do ￿nd some suggestive evidence. In particular, private
schools exist in 22 percent of villages with 15 years or less of exposure to a GSS , and in 33 percent of those
with more that 15 years. Moreover, it is really only older GSSs’ which have an impact. We can conduct
a similar placebo exercise as in Table III, Column (7) except we now include villages in the ￿non-program￿
group if they or a village in their QH received a GSS less than 5 years ago. Similar to the Column (7) result,
we ￿nd that there is no reduced form e￿ect of the instrument in this sample, i.e. it is only 5 years or more
exposure to GSSs that matters. Finally, consistent with the supply channel, we ￿nd from a smaller but
more in-depth sample that the female private school teachers are in the age-group that would be consistent
with the GSS construction period - the median private school female teacher age is 22 with over 90 percent
between 18-32 years of age.
25number of public boys’ primary schools as an additional instrument in the selection equation.
In the presence of competitive schooling e￿ects, private schools should be less likely to set
up in villages where there are public boys’ primary schools. Additionally, such schools are
unlikely to a￿ect the wage-bill of the entrepreneur directly since public school teachers are
rarely, if ever, hired locally and because their wages are ￿xed and centrally determined.
While we remain cautious in pushing this instrument since primary schools for boys may
be endogenously placed, it does serve as a robustness check on the identi￿cation based on
non-linearities in the selection equation. Columns (2) and (4) use the functional form of the
selection equation to achieve identi￿cation, and Columns (3) and (5) introduce the additional
instrument. The results are similar to the OLS estimates, with estimates of 27 to 28 percent 22
suggesting that selection into the non-zero wage sample is of limited importance.
Columns (6) and (7) present tentative evidence that wage declines due to a GSS are
larger in villages where labor markets for women are more restricted and localized, i.e., the
interaction terms of GSS existence and the village progressivity indicator are positive. In
Column (6), we look at the di￿erential e￿ect of GSS construction on wages for more and
less progressive villages using the female/male ratio for children under the age of 14 as an
indicator of progressivity/gender bias. Arguably, villages with a lower female/male child ra-
tio may be more conservative with fewer labor market opportunities for women outside the
immediate vicinity of the house. Indeed, villages at the 25th percentile of the distribution (fe-
male/male ratio of 0.86) see a wage decline of 58 percent due to GSS construction, compared
to essentially no decline for villages at the 75th percentile of the distribution (female/male
ratio of almost 1).
In Column (7), we look at analogous results using households per capita with access
to radios as an indicator of village-level development. While the results for the interaction
term are only signi￿cant at the 26 percent level in this case, the signs are in the expected
22Since our dependent variable is log (wage), the coe￿cients of about -0.32 on the GSS existence dummy
represent a decrease of approximately 27 percent in average wages. For example, in Column (2), the coe￿cient
implies that, in villages with a GSS, wages change by a factor of e￿0:3207(or 0.7256) , which is equivalent to
a 27.44 percent decline.
26direction. Wages decline by 46 percent decline in villages where no houses have access to
radios (6 percent of the sample), compared to a 26 percent decline in villages which are at
the 75th percentile of the radio access distribution. While encouraging, these results are at
best tentative. Endogenous variation (these variables are only available in the 1998 and not
baseline, i.e. 1981, census), as well as the suitability of these two indicators as proxies for the
restrictiveness of the female labor market, requires that they be viewed with some caution.
One may posit more nuanced demand-side explanations for such wage e￿ects that intro-
duce heterogeneity in the quality of teachers. We believe such stories are neither plausible
nor empirically supported. For example, if increased demand spurs perverse competition
across (private) schools (with parents unable to judge/evaluate quality), this may result in
a ￿race to the bottom.￿ In such a story, wages drop in villages with a GSS not because of
the supply shifter but because the increased demand causes so much school entry/expansion
that teacher quality (and hence wage) drops. However, given the large average wage drops
we ￿nd, this would imply that the quality of the marginal teacher is substantially worse. Yet,
not only is this implausible since parents are reasonably aware of teacher quality (Andrabi et
al. 2009) but our regressions control for the number of schools and show that villages with
more schools have higher wages. In other words, competition raises, not perversely lowers,
wages.
4.4 Discussion
The wage estimates we obtain are also broadly consistent with a set of arbitrage conditions
that should hold in equilibrium under a supply-side explanation. To see this, consider an
entrepreneur who plans to set up a private school in a village without a GSS. She has several
potential options, and for our results to be plausible, it must be (as we argue below) that
these options are not viable.
First, she could hire a male instead of a female teacher. If we assume that men have
fewer/no occupational and geographic mobility restrictions, this suggests that (equivalent)
27men must command at least 27% (the GSS impact on teacher wages) higher wages then
women. If they didn’t, then private schools could setup in villages without a GSS by hiring
(local/non-local) men rather than women as teachers. Andrabi et al. (2008) show that
men (with the same observed characteristics) indeed earn 33 percent more than women,
suggesting that men do not o￿er a viable teaching alternative.
Second, the entrepreneur could try to setup a school with a larger initial class-size in order
to pay for the greater cost of hiring a male teacher. However, this has the trade-o￿ of lowering
quality. A natural constraint here is that student performance in the private schools must
exceed that in the (free) public schools. Andrabi et al. (forthcoming) uses GMM methods
together with children who switch school types to show that the yearly value-added of private
schooling is around 0.25 standard-deviations. Although the estimates from the experimental
literature on class-size reductions vary somewhat, a number of studies suggest gains of 0.2
to 0.3 standard deviations due to a reduction of four to ten students (Angrist and Lavy
1999, Krueger 1999, Muralidharan and Sundararaman forthcoming). Given median wages
and school fees in Punjab, to generate enough revenue to cover the 33 percent higher wages
of a male teacher, the school would need a class size that is seven children more than the
median private school. This suggests that the quality drop from the increase in class size
required to hire male teachers would almost entirely o￿set the private school advantage in
these villages and hence not be viable. In other words, parents would choose public schools
instead if the private school had a larger class size.
Third, the entrepreneur could set fees 33 percent higher than the current levels. Using
data from Pakistan, Carnero et al. (2010) structurally estimate the elasticity of private
school market shares to fees and ￿nd that a 1 percent increase in prices reduces the market
share per private school by 1.2 percent. Given this high price elasticity, private schools would
therefore not be able to increase pro￿ts by raising fees, ruling out this arbitrage opportunity,
as well.
285 Conclusion
Achieving universal primary education remains an elusive goal in many developing coun-
tries. While governments can choose to invest greater amounts in providing and subsidizing
the costs of public schooling, the budgetary implications of such a task are daunting. Pri-
vate educational provision is an increasing presence, particularly in developing countries,
with shares exceeding 20 percent at the primary level in a large number of countries.
The crucial question is whether the market can o￿er a￿ordable and quality education at
a scale that can complement the public sector in achieving universal enrollment goals. This
paper underscores that for this to happen local supply-side constraints need to be alleviated.
While not surprising at the aggregate level, the result that (teacher) supply curves are not
perfectly elastic at the village level can generate poverty traps in credit-constrained environ-
ments (Ljungqvist 1993 and Banerjee 2004). 23 Higher returns to education may perversely
lead to declines in the provision of education if the returns increase as a consequence of
higher wages in non-teaching professions. Moreover, locally upward-sloping supply curves
have consequences for the pricing of voucher schemes. Depending on the elasticity of supply,
increases in demand through vouchers may lead to simultaneous increases in prices, a decline
in quality (in price-capped schemes), or both.
In contrast to calls for larger primary school investments at the expense of secondary
schools, our ￿ndings suggest that both play a role. Public investments in secondary schools
increase the supply of potential teachers locally and foster the growth of private schools,
potentially leading to a virtuous cycle of human capital accumulation.
The changes documented in this paper represent more than just a sectoral realignment
from public to private schools. Work in Pakistan and other countries suggests that the
23An upward sloping supply curve at the local level re￿ects supply constraints in the educational sector
as it arises due to local labor market restrictions. There is a natural parallel with the literature on credit
constraints. Evidence for such constraints is whether the cost of borrowing increases with the amount for
individual ￿rms. Again, that the cost of borrowing increases with the amount at the aggregate level is not
surprising; conversely, ￿rm-speci￿c borrowing costs that increase with the amount borrowed lead to several
important policy conclusions (see Banerjee and Du￿o 2004).
29growth of private schools represents an improvement in overall education, both in terms of
raising educational quality and by allowing for higher overall and female enrollment in the
village by reducing the distance to school and increasing the density of schooling options.
As in other low-income countries, private schools appear to o￿er higher-quality education
at far lower costs. The unionization and pay-grade of public teachers implies that per-child
costs of private schools is half that of public schools (Jimenez et al. 1991, Kim et al. 1999,
Alderman et al. 2003, Hoxby and Leigh 2004).
The importance of supply-side constraints however, cautions against over optimism re-
garding market educational provision and emphasizes the public sector’s role. This is par-
ticularly important given a new round of pessimism about public sector provision. In South
Asia for instance, the public sector is widely regarded as broken. With teacher absenteeism
exceeding 40 percent in some areas (Chaudhury et al. 2006) and political imperatives mak-
ing reform di￿cult (see, Grindle 2004), the private sector is increasingly viewed as a viable
alternative (Tooley 2005, Tooley and Dixon 2005).
This paper shows that private sector schools do not arise in a vacuum. Previous public
investments ￿crowd-in￿ the private sector so that government schools are not only contem-
poraneous substitutes but also temporal complements with private sector provision (Tilak
and Sudarshan 2001 con￿rm a similar complementary relation in India). Moreover, analo-
gous supply-side constraints likely exist at higher education levels. The fact that the private
sector hasn’t made as much in-roads in secondary schooling suggests that teaching supply
constraints have yet to be alleviated at that level.
The public sector is then left with a tricky task in these environments. If the private
sector is indeed to play a role in educational provision, initial investments from the public
sector are required to build up the necessary supply of teachers. However, once the private
sector enters the local market, the public sector becomes a direct competitor for teachers in
a very limited market. Since public school teachers are paid substantially more than their
private sector counterparts (￿ve times more in the case of Pakistan), this direct competition
30coupled with poor accountability in the government sector now hurts educational provision.
If, as we suggest, private schools represent an increase in the quality of education and raise
overall enrollment levels rather than a shift in its sectoral composition, the public sector has
to do enough, but not too much.
31Appendix I
Selection Issues in the Wage Bill
Since we only observe the wage bill in villages where there is a private school, a concern
described in the main text is that simple OLS estimates may be biased if such selection is
not accounted for. Here, we provide details on two approaches that we use in the paper
to address such concerns. Following Angrist (1995), the problem can be formally stated as
follows. The wage-bill is determined through a linear equation conditional on the existence
of a private school
WBi = ￿ + ￿GSSi + "i (6)
and a censoring equation (denoting WBi = I as the indicator for whether WBi is non-
missing)
WBi = If￿GSSi ￿ ￿i > 0g: (7)
The instrument, Zi, determines a ￿rst stage
GSSi = ￿ + ￿Zi + ￿i: (8)
Given the validity of the instrument, Zi, we assume that cov(￿i;Zi) = 0. Then,
E("ijZi;WBi = 1) = E("ijZi;(￿￿ + ￿￿Zi > ￿i ￿ ￿￿i)
so that cov("i;Zi) 6= 0 in Equation (6) above. Thus, although Zi is a valid instrument
for the decision to setup a private school, it is not a valid instrument in Equation (6). There
are two potential solutions.
Following Heckman (1979), if we assume that ("i;￿i;￿i) are jointly normally distributed,
homoskedastic, and independent of Zi, we obtain the familiar ￿Mills ratio￿ as the relevant
32expectation function conditional on participation. That is,
E("ijZi;(￿￿ + ￿￿Zi > ￿i ￿ ￿￿i) = ￿(￿￿ + ￿￿Zi)
where ￿(￿￿ + ￿￿Zi) =
￿￿(￿(￿￿+￿￿Zi))
￿(￿(￿￿+￿￿Zi)) and ￿(:) and ￿(:) are the density and distribution
functions of the normal distribution for ￿i￿￿￿i. This Mills ratio can is then directly included
in Equation (6) as the appropriate selection-correction.
An alternative approach, proposed by Heckman and Robb (1986) and developed by Ahn
and Powell (1993), uses the ￿control-function￿ approach, where we condition on the predicted
probability of WBi = 1 in Equation (6). In essence, this method proposes to estimate ￿ by
using pair-wise di￿erences in WBi for two villages (in our case) for which the non-parametric
probability of participation is very close. The approach is implemented by ￿rst estimating
Equation (7) directly, and then including the predicted probability of participation (and its
polynomials) as additional controls in Equation (6).
Appendix II
Comparing Linear IV and Biprobit estimates
Chiburish et al. (2006) show that in the model given by
T
￿ = ￿z + c1 + "1
T = 1[T ￿ 0]
Y
￿ = ￿T + c2 + "2
Y = 1[Y
￿ ￿ 0]
with ("1;"2) jointly distributed as standard bivariate normal with correlation ￿, pT = (T = 1)
and pY = (Y = 1), the the local average treatment e￿ect or LATE estimated by the linear











and the asymptotic variance is approximated by
N Var[^ ￿IV ] ￿
pY (1 ￿ pY )
￿2[￿(￿￿1(pT))]2Var[z]
:
Asymptotic variance of the IV estimator increases as pY gets closer to 1/2 and as pT gets
closer to 0, both of which characterize the case discussed here.
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39Variable Mean 50
th Percentile S.D. N
1981 Number of Women with Middle+ Education 4.28 1 17.94 9333
1998 Number of Women with Middle+ Education 26.74 9 92.80 9333
1981 Percent Women with Middle+ Education 0.01 0 0.03 8882
1998 Percent Women with Middle+ Education 0.06 0.03 0.07 8915
Households Per Capita With Radio Access (1998) 0.03 0.02 0.03 8952
Ratio of Females to Males, Under Age 14 (1998) 0.94 0.93 0.24 8892
Area (Acres, 1998) 1550.34 1042 2520.51 9091
Percent of Houses Permanent (1998) 0.06 0.06 0.05 8935
1981 Total Population 1020.36 667.00 1247.91 9333
1998 Total Population 1537.70 961.00 2053.87 9333
1981 Population of Largest Village in PC  1670.04 1375.00 1310.46 9333
Number of Villages in PC (1998) 4.57 4 2.28 9333
Girls' Secondary School Exists 0.02 0 0.16 9333
Girls' Primary School Exists 0.56 1 0.50 9330
Boys' Secondary School Exists 0.01 0 0.12 9333
Boys' Primary School Exists 0.70 1 0.46 9330
Girls' Secondary School Exposure (if one exists) 13.15 14 5.47 232
Girls' Primary School Exposure (if one exists) 21.43 18 11.80 4967
Boys' Secondary School Exposure (if one exists) 12.62 13.50 5.16 138
Boys' Primary School Exposure (if one exists) 35.21 31 19.66 6475
Private School Exists 0.13 0 0.33 9258
Number of Private Schools 0.22 0 0.87 9258
Private School Enrollment Rate (if one exists) 0.12 0.06 0.37 1165
Table I - Summary Statistics (Village Level)
This table presents summary statistics for various variables of interest. The years for which the above data are given 
varies by source: All 1981/1998 variables are from the 1981/1998 Population Censuses while all schooling data is 
from the EMIS, NEC, or Private School Census.



















Instrument 0.0124*** 0.016*** 0.011 0.011 0.0008 -0.0002 0.002 0.002 0.012***
(0.004) (0.005) (0.015) (0.014) (0.0037) (0.0008) (0.001) (0.001) (0.004)
-0.005 -0.003
-0.008 (0.008)
Girls' Primary School Exists -0.052***
(0.004)
Boys' Secondary School Exists 0.232***
(0.017)
Boys' Primary School Exists 0.003
(0.005)
Area (000s of Acres) 0.001
(0.002)
% Houses Permanent 0.076
(0.053)
1981 Population (000s) 0.0059* 0.014 0.293*** 0.374*** -0.002 0.002 0.018*** -0.002 0.0087** 0.006*
(0.004) (0.010) (0.027) (0.025) -0.007 (0.001) (0.002) -0.002 (0.0035) (0.004)
1981 Population (000s)
2 -0.0003 (0.001) -0.033*** -0.041*** 0.002* -0.0003* -0.002*** 0.0001 -0.0005** -0.0003
(0.0002) (0.001) (0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.0002)
1998 Population (000s) 0.003 0.003 -0.019 -0.054*** 0.008** 0.0001 -0.002 0.001 0.0029 0.003
(0.002) (0.005) (0.014) (0.013) (0.003) (0.0007) (0.001) -0.001 (0.0020) (0.002)
1998 Population (000s)
2 -2x10















PC Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-Squared 0.48 0.46 0.48 0.42 0.70 0.69
Adjusted R-Squared 0.17
Pseudo R-Squared 0.05 0.05 0.05
Chi-Square Stat (Instrument = 0) 13.04
F-Stat (Instrument = 0) 8.9
Observations 9333 8705 9330 9330 9333 8935 8935 8935 9333 9333
Table II - First Stage and Falsification Tests
OLS Falsification Tests - Other Public Goods Falsification Test  -  Probit with QH 
Top Rank
Standard errors in parentheses with * indicating significance at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%. Columns (1)-(2)  present first stage regressions using the eligibility rule as a predictor for the location of GSS. Column (1) 
gives the increased probability of finding a GSS in an eligible village (with basic population controls). Column (2) presents a linear first stage that includes controls for the village's population in 1981 and 1998, other 
village level public goods, and PC fixed effects. Columns (3)-(8) check that the instrument does not predict other public goods. Columns (9)-(10) show that a village having the highest population within a QH does not 
predict GSS construction.
First Stage - Probit and OLS
Has Highest Population 
   in QH, 1981


















0.095*** 0.097*** 1.505* 0.266* 0.246***
(0.025) (0.025) (0.802) (0.151) (0.092)
Girls' Primary School Exists 0.016* 0.089** xx xx 0.007 0.017
(0.0080) (0.043) (0.011) (0.014)
Boys' Secondary School Exists -0.005 -0.333* xx xx -0.030 0.112*
(0.034) (0.191) (0.040) (0.063)
Boys' Primary School Exists -0.005 -0.009 xx xx -0.009 0.001







Area (000s of Acres) -0.008** -0.009** xx xx -0.029*** -0.002
(0.003) (0.004) (0.007) (0.004)
% Houses Permanent 0.194* 0.083 xx xx 0.184 0.208
(0.103) (0.142) (0.133) (0.163)
1981 Population (000s) 0.046*** 0.013 xx xx 0.035 0.054*
(0.017) (0.028) (0.027) (0.028)
1981 Population (000s)
2 -0.0030 -0.0002 xx xx 0.004 -0.007**
(0.002) (0.003) (0.004) (0.003)
1998 Population (000s) 0.064*** 0.059*** xx xx 0.060*** 0.067***
(0.009) (0.012) (0.012) (0.014)
1998 Population (000s)
2 -0.001*** -0.001*** xx xx -0.002*** -0.002***
(0.0003) (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0004)
∆ Population (000s) 0.075***
(0.005)
PC Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y
R-Squared 0.51 0.57
Adjusted R-Squared 0.31 0.28
Prob > F 37.81 24.71
Prob > Chi-Square 0.00
Observations 8705 8900 8705 8705 8705 5191 3514
Number of PCs (1998) 2784
Table III - GSS Impact on Private School Existence
Standard errors in parentheses with * indicating significance at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%. This table presents regression results for which the 
dependent variable is a dummy indicating the presence of at least one private school in a village (or the change in this variable for the first difference 
specification). Column (1)  gives OLS results for the impact of GSS on private school existance. Column (2) shows a first-differenced specification.  (First-
differencing Girls' Seconary School Exists does not change the variable because our sample contains no villages which had a GSS prior to 1981. That is, 
having a GSS in our sample is equivalent to receiving one after 1981.) Columns (3)-(5) present the IV specifications. Column (3) gives the second stage 
results from a linear specification. Columns (4)-(5) implement the bivariate probit specification and report, respectively, the average treatment effect and 
the treatment on the treated effect of a GSS on the existence of a private school with analytical standard-errors computed using the delta method. 
Controls are present in these two regressions where marked, but coefficients and standard errors are not given. These regressions also include (in the 
absence of PC fixed effects) linear and quadratic controls for the population of the largest village in the PC as well as a control for the number of villages 
in the PC. Columns (6)-(7) present an additional check of the instrument by showing that the reduced form only holds in broad areas where at least one 
GSS was provided. Villages are divided into two sub-groups: "program regions," where at least one village in the QH received a GSS [Column(6)]; and "non-
program regions," where no village in the QH received a GSS [Column (7)].
Received Girls' Primary 
   School After 1981
Received Boys' Secondary 
   School After 1981
Received Boys' Primary 
   School After 1981
Girls' Secondary School Exists 
( = Received GSS After 1981)

























Girls' Secondary School Exists 0.097*** 10.81*** 9.52*** 219.32**
(0.025) (2.93) (3.55) (103.06)
Girls' Primary School Exists 2.37** 13.08** 1.79*
(0.99) (5.46) (0.98)
Boys' Secondary School Exists 7.51* -40.96* 9.98**
(3.98) (24.55) (3.93)








% Women with Middle+ Education 0.376***
(0.084)
% Men with Middle+ Education 0.033
(0.049)
∆ % Women w/ Middle+ Education 0.414***
(0.086)
∆ % Men w/ Middle+ Education -0.047
(0.050)
Area (000s of Acres) -0.008** -2.03*** -2.15*** -2.03*** -0.008**
(0.003) (0.39) (0.53) (0.39) (0.003)
% Houses Permanent 0.187* 44.83*** 28.43 45.14*** 0.276**
(0.104) (12.05) (18.30) (12.06) (0.128)
1981 Population (000s) 0.028 -1.61 -6.36* -3.35 0.046***
(0.018) (2.04) (3.63) (2.15) (0.017)
1981 Population (000s)
2 -0.001 -0.32 0.07 -0.16 -0.003
(0.002) (0.24) (0.38) (0.25) (0.002)
1998 Population (000s) 0.065*** 9.71*** 8.91*** 9.45*** 0.064***
(0.009) (1.05) (1.49) (1.06) (0.009)
1998 Population (000s)
2 -0.0012*** 1.79*** 1.76*** 1.79*** -0.0012***
(0.0003) (0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.0003)
∆ Population (000s) 0.075*** 60.39*** 0.072***
(0.005) (0.71) (0.005)
PC Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R-Squared 0.32 0.28 0.88 0.77 0.88 0.32 0.27
Prob > F 4.08
Observations 8355 8900 8705 8975 8705 8705 8685 8711
Received Boys' Primary 
   School After 1981
Table IV - Private School Existence: The Female Teacher Channel
Standard errors in parentheses with * indicating significance at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%. Columns (1)-(2) present estimates for the effects of 
school exposure on private school existance from a linear probability model and a first difference specification. (First-differencing Girls' Seconary 
School Exists does not change the variable because our sample contains no villages which had a GSS prior to 1981. That is, having a GSS in our 
sample is equivalent to receiving one after 1981.) Using the same approach, Columns (3)-(4) assess the correlation between educated women and 
the presence of a GSS. Columns (5)-(6) examine this relationship through an instrumental variable specification and present the second stage and 
reduced form. Finally, columns (7)-(8) show the extent to which the extent of secondary-school-educated women in the village are associated with 
private school existence.
Private School Exists Number of Women with Middle+ Education Private School Exists
Years Exposure to Girls' 
   Secondary School
Years Exposure to Girls' 
   Primary School
Years Exposure to Boys' 
   Secondary School
Years Exposure to Boys' 
   Primary School
Received Girls' Primary 
   School After 1981
Received Boys' Secondary 
   School After 1981







Control Function  
(Expanded First Stage)
OLS OLS
Girls' Secondary School Exists -0.318* -0.321*** -0.321*** -0.324* -0.325* -6.488* -0.614**
(0.186) (0.091) (0.092) (0.191) (0.187) (3.370) (0.309)
Girls' Primary School Exists 0.075 0.061 0.061 0.069 0.068 0.057 0.074
(0.087) (0.042) (0.043) (0.099) (0.088) (0.087) (0.087)
Boys' Secondary School Exists 0.295 0.282** 0.285** 0.269 0.269 0.333 0.299
(0.220) (0.111) (0.112) (0.226) (0.225) (0.221) (0.220)
Boys' Primary School Exists 0.019 0.015 0.0001 0.013 0.010 0.036 0.011









Area (000s of Acres) -0.058 -0.056*** -0.058*** -0.058 -0.058 -0.061 -0.061
(0.039) (0.021) (0.021) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039) (0.039)
% Houses Permanent 0.006 0.055 0.046 0.016 0.003 -0.058 -0.238
(1.320) (0.635) (0.644) (1.329) (1.327) (1.318) (1.333)
1981 Population (000s) 0.122 0.274** 0.253** 0.198 0.186 0.138 0.136
(0.104) (0.110) (0.105) (0.185) (0.182) (0.105) (0.105)
1981 Population (000s)
2 -0.021* -0.039*** -0.037*** (0.031) (0.030) -0.021* -0.022*
(0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.021) (0.021) (0.012) (0.012)
1998 Population (000s) 0.028 0.097* 0.088* 0.033 0.027 0.016 0.027
(0.053) (0.052) (0.049) (0.093) (0.092) (0.053) (0.053)
1998 Population (000s)
2 0.001 -0.001 -0.001 0.0002 0.0003 0.001 0.001
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.001)
PC Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Adjusted R-Squared 0.46 0.45 0.46 0.46 0.46
Observations 1090 9292 9292 1090 1090 1090 1090
Table V - Supply Side Impact: Teaching Costs
Standard errors in parentheses with * indicating significance at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%. This table examines the impact of GSS on skilled women wages. The dependent 
variable is the (logarithm of the) average salary of a private school teacher in the village. Since private school teachers are almost entirely women and educated women are mostly 
employed as teachers, this measure is a reasonable proxy for skilled women wages. Column (1) presents the OLS results. The sample is slightly smaller than the number of villages 
where there is a private school since, in a few cases in the PEIP data, private schools did not report wages. Columns (2)-(5) correct for selection into the wage sample. Columns (2)-
(3) present results using Heckman's selection model. Columns (4)-(5) use the "control function" approach. Columns (3) and (5) include the presence of a government boys primary 
school in the village as an additional instrument in the selection stage. Finally, columns (6)-(7) present tentative evidence that wage declines are larger in villages where labor 
markets for women are more restricted. Column (6) examines the differential effect of GSS construction on wages for more and less progressive villages using the female/male 
ratio for children under the age of 14 as an indicator of gender bias. Column (7) presents similar results using households per capita with access to radios as an indicator of village-
level development.
Ratio of Females to Males, Under
   Age 14 × Girls' Secondary School Exists
Households Per Capita With Radio 
   Access × Girls' Secondary School Exists
Ratio of Females to Males, Under 
   Age 14
Households Per Capita With Radio 
   Access
45Figure I - Private School Existence / Rule-Based Instrument and 1981 Population
Figure II - Probabilities of Schools Existing by Instrument and Population Quartiles
Figure I illustrates how the existence of private schools and the binary instrument covary with 1981 village population 
(the relationship with 1998 population is very similar). Here, we plot the binary instrument, Rulei, for all villages in our 
sample and the non-parametric relationship between private school location and village population. We note that there 
are both "eligible" and "ineligible" villages at all population levels. The bar graphs illustrates the population distribution. 
Figure II provides a simple illustration of the our instrumental variable estimates by dividing villages into four population 
quartiles, averaged over 1981 and 1998 populations. The top panel illustrates the first stage by comparing the 
percentage of villages with a GSS in the "eligible" group compared to the “ineligible” group. The bottom panel illustrates 
the reduced form, by comparing, over the same population quartiles, the percentage of villages with a private school in 
the "eligible" and "ineligible" groups.
46Variable Instrument=1 Instrument=0 Difference P-Value
Area in Acres (1998) 2084.61 1326.88 757.73 0.00
44.58 32.12 57.43
Total Population (1981) 1644.75 759.79 884.96 0.00
22.78 14.48 26.82
Total Population (1998) 2516.91 1129.06 1387.85 0.00
43.42 22.22 44.38
% ∆ Population (1981 to 1998) 0.62 0.69 -0.07 0.24
0.030 0.037 0.059
Ratio of Females to Males (1981) 0.904 0.904 0.000 0.99
0.006 0.004 0.007
Ratio of Females to Males (1998) 0.938 0.946 -0.007 0.16
0.005 0.003 0.005
% Women Aged 4 and Below (1981) 0.158 0.154 0.004 0.63
0.007 0.005 0.008
% Women Aged 5-14 (1981) 0.285 0.284 0.001 0.92
0.009 0.006 0.010
% Women with ID Card (1998) 0.490 0.478 0.012 0.30
0.010 0.006 0.012
% Literate Women, Aged 15+ (1981) 0.016 0.017 -0.001 0.74
0.002 0.002 0.003
% Women with Middle+ Education, Aged 15+  0.014 0.014 0.000 0.91
0.002 0.001 0.003
% Men Aged 4 and Below (1981) 0.144 0.141 0.004 0.65
0.007 0.004 0.008
% Men Aged 5-14 (1981) 0.293 0.291 0.003 0.81
0.009 0.006 0.010
% Men with ID Card (1998) 0.691 0.684 0.007 0.50
0.009 0.006 0.011
% Literate Men, Aged 15+ (1981) 0.169 0.166 0.003 0.73
0.007 0.005 0.009
% Men with Middle+ Education, Aged 15+ (1981) 0.120 0.119 0.001 0.95
0.006 0.004 0.007
% Houses Permanent (1998) 0.063 0.065 -0.002 0.76
0.005 0.003 0.006
% Households with Water (1998) 0.011 0.010 0.001 0.61
0.002 0.001 0.002
% Households with Electricity (1998) 0.075 0.068 0.006 0.27
0.005 0.003 0.006
% Households with TV (1998) 0.029 0.028 0.001 0.82
0.003 0.002 0.004
% Household with Radio (1998) 0.025 0.028 -0.003 0.38
0.003 0.002 0.004
Appendix Table I - Differences in Means
Standard errors in parentheses. This tables gives evidence that there are no unexpected baseline differences in observables 
between eligible (Instrument = 1) and ineligible (Instrument = 0) villages. The only significant differences are in population 
and area, which arise directly from the construction of the instrument. Several 1998 variables of interest are included 
when 1981 numbers are not available, though these are not, strictly speaking, baseline measurements.























Girls' Secondary School Exists 0.100*** 1.082*** 0.309*** 31.82***
(0.009) (0.257) (0.033) (1.41)
Girls' Primary School Exists -0.227*** -0.007 0.217*** xx -3.19***
(0.005) (0.006) (0.059) (0.94)
Boys' Secondary School Exists 0.254*** 0.093*** -0.158** xx 8.36***
(0.007) (0.008) (0.067) (1.35)
Boys' Primary School Exists 0.043*** -0.003 -0.045*** xx 0.35





















% Women with Middle+ Education 0.589***
(0.055)
% Men with Middle+ Education 0.090**
(0.035)
Area (000s of Acres) -0.005*** -0.009*** -0.004* xx -0.009*** -3.85*** -0.008*** -0.000***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.003) (0.002) (0.28) (0.002) (0.000)
% Houses Permanent 0.123** 0.331*** 0.209** xx 0.332*** 38.82*** 0.349*** 0.425
(0.059) (0.067) (0.094) (0.067) (10.78) (0.088) (0.325)
1981 Population (000s) 0.037*** 0.054*** 0.059*** -0.004 xx 0.053*** -0.37 0.068*** 0.040
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.019) (0.008) (1.16) (0.007) (0.029)
1981 Population (000s)
2 -0.0006*** -0.001*** -0.004*** (0.001) xx -0.005*** 0.85*** -0.005*** -0.005*
(0.0001) (0.0001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.13) (0.001) (0.003)
1998 Population (000s) 0.053*** 0.081*** 0.086*** 0.044'*** xx 0.082*** 21.34*** 0.094*** 0.024
(0.007) (0.007) (0.004) (0.012) (0.004) (0.64) (0.004) (0.015)
1998 Population (000s)
2 -0.003*** -0.003*** -0.002*** -0.001*** xx -0.002*** 0.99*** -0.002*** 1x10
-9
(0.001) (0.001) (0.0001) (0.0003) (0.0002) (0.02) (0.0001) (0.0003)
PC Fixed Effects Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
R-Squared 0.48
Adjusted R-Squared 0.40 0.38 0.38 0.86 0.38
F-Stat (Instrument = 0) 33.80
Prob > Chi-Square 0.00
Observations 23756 25874 23756 23756 23756  22845 23756 23698 27819
Number of PCs (1998) 7142
Standard errors in parentheses with * indicating significance at 10%, ** at 5%, and *** at 1%. This table replicates some of the main regressions in the previous tables to demonstrate that 
the results hold in the full sample as well. Column (1) and (2) correspond to Table II, Columns (2) and (5), respectively. Column (3), (4), and (5) correspond to Table III, Columns (1), (3), and 
(4), respectively. Columns (6), (7), and (8) correspond to Table IV, Columns (1), (3), and (7), respectively. Column (9) corresponds to Table V, Column (2). Column (9) includes squared terms 
for exposure in the expectation that short-term exposure decreases wages by increasing supply, while in the longer term, exposure may increase wages as educated women become mothers 
who increase demand for teachers.
Years Exposure to Girls' 
   Primary School
2
Years Exposure to Boys' 
   Secondary School
Years Exposure to Boys' 
   Secondary School
2
Years Exposure to Boys' 
   Primary School
Years Exposure to Boys' 
   Primary School
2
Appendix Table II - Full Sample Regressions
Years Exposure to Girls' 
   Secondary School
Years Exposure to Girls' 
   Secondary School
2
Years Exposure to Girls' 
   Primary School
First Stage / Falsification Test 
(OLS)
Impact on Private School Existence Channels (OLS)
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